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North Korea and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. By Assia Dosseva.
The fourth session of the six-party talks in Beijing ended with what
many in the American and international community considered a
breakthrough in the Korean peninsula crisis. The September 19 North Korea-
U.S. Joint Statement presented an agenda for the complete, verifiable, and
irreversible elimination of all plutonium and uranium programs in North
Korea, as well as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) return
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and compliance with International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.'
There are a host of general problems related to the transformation of the
six-party talks into an agreement with "binding force,"2 and enforcement of
such an agreement in view of North Korea's dismal compliance record.
Additionally, a number of legal difficulties surround North Korea's departure
and return to the NPT, and the accompanying IAEA safeguard requirements.
There are two key questions governing the DPRK's possible return to the
NPT. First, did North Korea leave the treaty in compliance with the treaty's
withdrawal terms? Second, are there provisions in the treaty that clarify the
steps necessary for repeated accession, and are there requirements that may
preclude the DPRK from returning to the treaty in a legally sound manner?
In view of these problems, there are three possible scenarios for
Pyongyang's relationship with the NPT: (1) North Korea's return to the treaty
before full and verifiable denuclearization; (2) North Korea's failure to return
to the treaty; or (3) North Korea's return to the treaty after full and verifiable
denuclearization. The third option would best meet the objectives of the six-
party talks and the security interests of the international community.
Article X of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provides for the right
of every sovereign nation to withdraw from the Treaty upon "notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations
Security Council three months in advance.",4 After North Korea denied the
IAEA access to suspected nuclear waste sites in early 1993, the Agency asked
the UN Security Council for special ad hoc inspections. As a result, in March
I. Press Statement, North Korea-U.S. Statement, Assistant Sec'y of State Christopher R.
Hill's Statement at the Closing Plenary of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (Sept. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53499.htm [hereinafter Press Statement].
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(defining "binding force" broadly).
3. Since 1985, when it ratified the NPT, the DPRK has broken all promises or obligations
related to its denuclearization. See, e.g., Nicholas Eberstadt, Diplomatic Fantasyland: The Illusion of a
Negotiated Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, NAUTILUS INST. POL'Y F. ONLINE (2003),
available at http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0342 Eberstadt.html. These promises include the
Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Jan. 20,
1992, 33 I.L.M. 569; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1978, 729 U.N.T.S
168 [hereinafter NPT];The Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1994), available at http://www.state.gov
/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htn.
4. NPT, supra note 3, art. X.
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1993 the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. After
"intense bilateral negotiations with the United States,"5 North Korea agreed to
suspend its withdrawal. In 2002, the DPRK government admitted to
possessing a highly-enriched uranium program, leading to economic sanctions
by the United States. As a result, in January 2003, Pyongyang declared its
withdrawal from the NPT. The DPRK claimed the withdrawal was effective
immediately because eighty-nine days had elapsed since 1993 when North
Korea had first announced its intention "before suspending its intention to
withdraw from the treaty."
6
The second requirement for a country's legitimate use of Article X of
the NPT is the presence of "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, [that] have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country."7
Upon examination of the events between 1985, when Pyongyang ratified the
NPT, and 2003, when it withdrew, there is no evidence that any such
"extraordinary event" took place. In fact, when Pyongyang failed to ratify the
IAEA safeguards agreement in the time allocated to it by the Treaty,I it
demanded instead that the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from
South Korea and that Washington and Seoul terminate their joint military
exercises, known as "Team Spirit." Though these requests had no legitimate
basis, 9 in September 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared that the
United States would not maintain nuclear weapons in South Korea. In
December 1991, President Roo Tae Woo affirmed that South Korea was free
of nuclear weapons. 0
With the exception of the Security Council's orders requiring Iraq to end
its nuclear weapons proliferation and to agree to IAEA inspections after the
1991 Gulf War and again in 2002, no past decisions of the Security Council
related to NPT enforcement resulted in an order that required an offending
country to discontinue activities related to nuclear weapons production. Even
after the IAEA's Board of Governors had reported North Korea's
noncompliance to the Security Council, and North Korea had given its
withdrawal notice from the NPT in 1993, the Security Council was divided.
The Council's only point of agreement was its demand that North Korea
permit IAEA inspections, which North Korea then refused to do." In view of
North Korea's dubious compliance with the waiting period requirement and
5. Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea Profile: Nuclear Overview,
http://www.nti.org/eresearch/profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.html (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter North Korea
Profile].
6. Id.
7. NPT, supra note 3, art X.
8. Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, it did not sign the IAEA's safeguards
agreement until January 1992. The period for compliance with IAEA's safeguards after signing the NPT
is eighteen months. In North Korea's case, because of mistake in documentation on IAEA's part, North
Korea was given another eighteen months to comply, but still failed to ratify the agreement before 1992.
9. The military alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)
is regulated by a Mutual Defense Treaty to which North Korea is not a party. Mutual Defense Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Oct. 1, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 2368, 238
U.N.T.S. 199.
10. North Korea Profile, supra note 5.
11. See George Bunn, A Brief History of the DPRK's Nuclear Weapons-Related Efforts, in
VERIFYING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK 15, 16-17 (Michael May ed., 2001), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mam04/mam04.pdf.
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the "extraordinary events" requirement, many consider the DPRK's
withdrawal from the treaty at best problematic.'
2
Article IX, section 1 of the NPT states that a country "which does not
sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this Article, may accede at any time."1 3 In spite of existing doubts, if we
assume that Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT in a legal manner, it would
seem sufficient for North Korea to go through the motions necessary for
accession to the NPT, as would any new candidate for membership.
14
The NPT imposes different types of obligations on countries defined
under the treaty as nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. ' 5 When North
Korea ratified the treaty in 1985, it joined as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
However, given IAEA analysis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, combined
with U.S. intelligence and declarations by the North Korean government
regarding the DPRK's alleged nuclear weapons possession and production
capabilities, 16 if North Korea rejoined the treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon
state, it would be in immediate violation of the treaty, producing a slew of
legal and procedural problems.
On the other hand, Article IX, Section 3 of the NPT defines a nuclear-
weapon state as one "which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon
12. See, e.g., George Bunn & John Rhinelander, The Right To Withdraw from the NPT:
Article X Is Not Unconditional, in 79 DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (2005), available at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79gbjr.htm; France, Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Regime (Preparatory Comm. for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.IIIIWP.22, May 4, 2004), available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/papers/Francewp22.pdf; Germany,
Strengthening the NPT Against Withdrawal and Non-Compliance: Suggestions for the Establishment of
Procedures and Mechanisms (Preparatory Comm. for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP. 15, Apr. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/papers/GermanyWPI 5.pdf.
13. NPT, supra note 3, art. IX.
14. It is worth examining North Korea's violations of the NPT prior to its withdrawal as a
possible legal hindrance to rejoining the treaty. However, at the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT,
proposals by Germany and France for amendments to provide for such instances did not manage to
gamer the necessary support. See supra note 12.
15. See NPT, supra note 3, art. I ("Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control
over such weapons and explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in a way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."); id. art. II ("Each non-
nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.").
16. See, e.g., No Good Choices: The Implications of a Nuclear North-Korea, Hearing Before
the H. Int'l Relations Comm., Subcomms. on Asia and the Pacific and Int'l Terrorism and
Nonproliferation, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Jon Brook Wolfsthal, Deputy Dir. for
Nonproliferation, Camegie Endowment for International Peace), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/JonWolfsthaltestimony.pdf; MICHAEL O'HANLON &
MIKE MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, How To DEAL WITH A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA
(2003); Jeremy Bransten, North Korea: Pyongyang Claims It Has Nuclear Weapons, Pulls Out of Six-
Party Talks, RADIOFREE EUROPE: RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/02/a6a9c8ab-2ba5-4d84-977e-77c605b17cdahtml; Anthony
Faiola & Phillip P. Pan, N. Korea Declaration Draws World Concern; Nuclear Arms Assertion Spurs
Calls To Revive Talks, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at Al.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31: 265
or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1967."' 17 Therefore, North
Korea is, by definition, precluded from rejoining the treaty as a nuclear-
weapon state.
Hence, the only way in which North Korea would be able to rejoin the
NPT in a legally acceptable manner would be to dismantle its nuclear
programs completely and verifiably before rejoining the treaty under a non-
nuclear-weapon state classification. This option would require that North
Korea denuclearize in good faith and independently of IAEA inspections.
In considering the alternative developments in the DPRK's future
relationship with the NPT, it is important to review the objectives of the six-
party talks statement: first, the DPRK's complete and verifiable
denuclearization "by credible international means," and second, rejoining the
NPT and coming into "full compliance with IAEA safeguards."18 As there is
currently no prospect of a binding agreement, the issue of whether the
denuclearization of North Korea would take place before or after re-accession
to the NPT, or without any undertaking to rejoin the NPT at all, remains open.
In view of that, there are three possible variations on North Korea's future
relationship with the NPT.
First, as discussed previously, if North Korea decides to return to the
NPT, it will have to do so as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Nevertheless, if the
DPRK ratifies the treaty as such before it has denuclearized, it will
immediately be in violation of Article II of the NPT, which holds that "[e]ach
non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes . . . not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices . . . .19 It is possible that the United States and the international
community would decide to turn a blind eye to this discrepancy in order to
bring North Korea back under the supervisory authority of the IAEA and the
reach of the United Nations Security Council. However, such an action would
constitute a considerable gamble with the objectives of the six-party talks.
Even if North Korea denuclearizes after rejoining the NPT in a complete and
verifiable manner, and to the satisfaction of the IAEA's safeguards and
regulations, the authority of the NPT treaty would be further undermined by
allowing a former member with a record of violations against the treaty to
rejoin the NPT in immediate violation of the same.
Worse still, if North Korea rejoins the NPT before denuclearizing, it
may subsequently refuse to dismantle its nuclear programs. Article IV of the
NPT, which protects "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty, presents a convenient loophole for continued nuclear weapon
proliferation under the treaty. Thus, a nuclear-weapon state may opt to accede
to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in order to legalize the continued
use and development of its existing nuclear technologies under the "for
peaceful purposes" provision of Article IV. Once it becomes impossible to
17. NPT, supra note 3, art. IX.
18. Press Statement, supra note 1.
19. NPT, supra note 3, art. II.
20. NPT, supra note 3, art. IV.
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conceal the primary purpose of its nuclear technology, the state in question
may leave the treaty legally if it is in compliance with Article X.21 Similar
violations of the NPT, both by North Korea before its withdrawal from the
treaty and by Iran on a regular and ongoing basis within the framework of
NPT and IAEA regulations, have not been sanctioned.22 In view of the latter,
an outcome devastating to both objectives of the six-party talks seems likely.23
In the second scenario, North Korea may refuse to rejoin the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether. Although Pyongyang would remain
outside of the framework of NPT and IAEA regulations, this scenario does not
predetermine the result of North Korea's denuclearization process. The DPRK
may dismantle its nuclear weapons program under pressure from the United
States and/or major Northeast Asian actors such as China and Japan. The
DPRK's denuclearization may also occur as a result of economic and political
incentives. If successful, this alternative will satisfy the denuclearization
objective of the six-party talks, but will not contribute to the strengthening of
the NPT. However, considering the history of bilateral and multilateral
negotiations, sanctions, and incentive initiatives between North Korea and the
United States, South Korea, and the international community, this scenario is
highly unlikely.24
Pyongyang's failure to join the NPT and to denuclearize would lead to
collapse of the main objectives of the six-party talks and would completely
undermine the negotiations process aimed at the resolution of the Korean
peninsula crisis. Though such a development would be highly unproductive
and unreasonable, experts across the political spectrum consider such an
outcome not improbable.25
The third scenario would call for the DPRK's denuclearization in good
faith and independently of IAEA inspections, prior to, and as a condition for,
its return to the NPT. After rejoining the treaty, thorough inspections by the
IAEA should be allowed in order to verify the satisfactory outcome of the
dismantling process. If successful, this option would satisfy both objectives of
the six-party talks-North Korea's denuclearization and its rejoining the NPT
in a legal manner.
21. See, e.g., Natasha Bajema & Mary Beth Nikitin, The Future ofInternational Regimes:
Organizations and Practices: Assessing Nuclear Maturity: Determining Which States Should Have
Access to What Nuclear Technology, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 157 (2004); David S. Jonas,
Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the Final Four Join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as Non-
Nuclear Weapons States While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 417.
22. See, e.g., Bunn, supra note 11; Jonas, supra note 21.
23. Additional concern in this scenario is not only what North Korea could or would do with
nuclear weapons, but also its potential to sell "weapons-grade fissile material or nuclear weapons to
other states and non-state actors, including terrorist groups." Jean Du Preez & William Potter, North
Korea's Withdrawal from the NPT: A Reality Check, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD., Apr. 10,
2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm.
24. See, e.g., O'HANLON, supra note 16, at 87-89; Nicholas Eberstadt, Alternative Scenarios
for the Korean Peninsula, in STRATEGIC ASIA 2004-05: CONFRONTING TERRORISM IN THE PURSUIT OF
POWER 109 (Ashley J. Tellis & Michael Wills, eds., 2004); Wolfsthal, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., Barbara Demick et al., N. Korea Sets Condition on Nuclear Pact; The Day After
Pledging To End Its Arms Program, the Regime Puts the Deal in Doubt by Demanding That the US.
First Provide It with a Light-Water Reactor, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al; Nicholas Eberstadt, A
Skeptical View, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2005, at A26; Barbara Slavin, N. Korea, US. Both Bend a Bit For
a Deal, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2005, at 5A.
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If we assume North Korea's willingness to proceed with this option,
there are two cases that may provide guidance in the process: South Africa's
voluntary denuclearization prior to its accession to the NPT in July 1991 and
Libya's voluntary nuclear dismantling in 2004. Together, these two cases
address the stepRs and actors necessary for a successful independent
denuclearization, and the procedure a member state in violation of the NPT
would have to follow in order to come into compliance with the NPT's
requirements and IAEA's safeguards. 27 While there are significant differences
between these cases and North Korea-South Africa was never in violation of
the treaty, and Libya never left the treaty-a combination of these two case
studies may provide guidance for the process North Korea would have to
follow in order to return to the NPT legally.
28
Although the joint statement of the fourth session of the six-party talks is
a step in the right direction, there are several uncertainties in the future
implementation and enforcement of its objectives. Considering the failure of
past bilateral and multilateral negotiations and programs between North Korea
and members of the international community, it would be in the interest of all
parties involved to implement the six-party talks objectives. This would not
only meet the goal of denuclearizing North Korea in a complete and verifiable
manner, but would also uphold the authority of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as a "treaty of continued relevance and indefinite duration given the
ongoing need to control the most dangerous technology even invented by
humankind."29
26. See, e.g., Waldo Stumpf, Presentation at "Fifty Years After Hiroshima" Conference, Birth
and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme (Sept. 28-Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm [hereinafter Stumpf Presentation].
27. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Libya Profile: Nuclear Overview, http://www.nti.org/
e_research/profiles/Libya/3939.htnl (Sept. 2005).
28. The fact that the NPT "only looks forward from the date of accession" offers additional
incentives to Pyongyang to follow this regime of NPT accession in view of national security
considerations and the future improvement of relations with the international community. Stumpf
Presentation, supra note 26. IAEA's "completeness" review, which will be a part of the accession
process would cover "only nuclear materials and facilities and would not include projects or
programmes from the past, which had been fully terminated before accession to the NPT." Id.
29. See O'HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 16, at 32.
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The Emperor's New Quotas: U.S. and EU Trade Policy on Chinese
Textiles. By Vivek Krishnamurthy.
Like Mao suits, Nehru jackets, and other fashion trends of the past that
have recently made a comeback, quotas are back in style in Europe and
America as the preferred way to manage trade in politically sensitive sectors
of the economy. The latest outbreak of retro trade policy is in the perennially
difficult area of clothing and textiles, where both the United States and the
European Community (EC) have been busily slapping quotas on Chinese
textile exports.
Exports of textiles from China to the United States surged by 46% in the
first eight months following the demise of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(MFA) on January 1, 2005, which had governed international trade in textiles
for forty years through a series of restrictive quotas.' No sooner had the MFA
expired, however, than the United States and the European Community rushed
to impose new quota-based "safeguard" measures to protect their
geographically concentrated (and thus politically influential) textile industries
from the rigors of competing with the efficient Chinese.
Apart from resulting in the build-up of embarrassingly large piles of
briefs, brassieres, and other textiles on European and American quaysides, the
readiness of the world's two largest economies to resort to naked
protectionism to prop up their marginal and declining textile industries does
not augur well for the successful extension of rules-based disciplines to other
far more contentious economic sectors under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). This may seem like a grim reading of what is essentially
a flap over towels and trousers, but the current quota-based restrictions on
Chinese textiles strike at the principle of non-discrimination that, along with
national treatment, forms the foundation of the international trade system.
Quota-based trade restrictions have long been a bane of economists
because they are opaque, market-distorting, and easily manipulable for
political purposes-all of which gave dismal scientists the world over reason
to cheer when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947
banned their use.2 The textile trade, however, has been an exception to this
general rule since at least 1957, when European and American textile
producers successfully agitated for quota-based protection against imports
from the low-cost producer of the day, Japan. 3 Further bilateral and short-term
multilateral quota deals in the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundation for the
highly discriminatory and much-reviled Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) of
1974, which allowed industrialized countries to limit textile imports from
developing countries using quotas while applying GATT's anti-quota rules to
textiles imported from fellow industrialized countries.
1. OFFICE OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE,
MAJOR SHIPPERS REPORT: SECTION ONE: TEXTILES AND APPAREL IMPORTS BY CATEGORY IN CATEGORY
UNITS, APPAREL IMPORTS-ALL MFA FIERS (QUANTITY), 08/2005 DATA (2005), available at
http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/msr/catl .htm.
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Slat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
3. Herbert N. Blackman, Status of Japanese Voluntary Limitations on Cotton Textile Exports
to the United States, 9 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1955-57, at 253, 253-58 (1987).
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Killing the MFA was one of the developing world's top priorities in the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations which began in 1986, and the
achievement of a new Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) that would
phase out quotas in the textile trade between 1995 and 2005 was widely
regarded as a major victory for these countries. From the outset, however, the
American and European reaction to the ATC has been less than enthusiastic,
as both successfully managed to have the reductions back-loaded such that
65% of the quotas by volume would be eliminated only at the end of the ten-
year transition period.4 In the case of the United States, which chose to first
eliminate its quotas on products where they were not being filled anyway,
over two-thirds of its textile imports by volume and some 80% of its imports
by value were still subject to quotas on December 31, 2004-the eve of the
end of the MFA. 5
Such procrastination by governments in preparing the ground for the end
of quotas in the textile trade is simply inexcusable, and cannot be condemned
strongly enough when the chief procrastinator is the country that usually
preaches freer trade with missionary zeal abroad. A more gradual phase-out of
textile quotas would not have given domestic industries any more time to
adjust, but it would have furnished them with stronger incentives to become
leaner and meaner, rather than to procrastinate and lobby their way out of their
predicament at the last minute, as both the European and American industries
ultimately did.
Well before the MFA breathed its last breath on New Year's Day 2005,
petitions from textile producers pleading for safeguards to protect them from a
tsunami of low-cost Chinese-made t-shirts began flooding the mailboxes of
6trade policymakers in Washington and Brussels. Long a part of the measures
available to governments to help domestic industries adjust to greater
competition after trade barriers have been lowered, both the original GATT
and the 1994 WTO Agreement on Safeguards allow countries to impose
temporary import restrictions on a product to prevent "injury" to domestic
manufacturers of similar products.7 A host of stringent conditions must be met
before safeguards can be imposed, of which five in particular stand out:
" a finding of actual or imminent injury to domestic industry; 8
" imposition of the minimal safeguards required to avert injury; 9
" duration of the safeguards for no more than four years at a time, to a
maximum of eight years;'
0
" application of safeguards to the product regardless of its source;" and
4. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing art. 2.8, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/16-tex.pdf.
5. The Looming Revolution: The Textile Industry, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2004, at 75.
6. See, e.g., Edward Alden & Raphael Minder, Chinese Textile Showdown Looms,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at 1.
7. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs e/legal .e/25-safeg.pdf.
8. Id. arts. 2.1, 4.
9. Id. art. 5.
10. Id. art. 7.
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e granting of equivalent trade concessions to the countries affected by the
safeguards.
1 2
The safeguards imposed by the United States and the European
Community against imports of textiles from China would be illegal under
these conditions, but conveniently for the Europeans and the Americans the
last two need not be met when enacting safeguards against products from
China. The protocol governing China's accession to the WTO in 2001 gives
members leave to impose safeguards against Chinese products alone without
requiring a grant of equivalent concessions to China for the first three years
the safeguards are in place. 13 These discriminatory measures were key to
securing the congressional approval needed for China to enter the WTO-
albeit as a second-class citizen for the twelve years that the measures will
remain in effect.
14
Thus, the crux of the current controversy over quotas as safeguards is
not whether they are permissible at all, but rather whether the safeguards, as
imposed by the Europeans and Americans, are truly necessary to protect their
domestic textile producers from "injury." Chinese skepticism about the need
for the quota-based safeguards is due in part to its own proactive measures to
ease the adjustment to a quota-free world by imposing a per-item export tax of
RMB 0.20 to RMB 0.30 ($0.016 to $0.024) on 148 categories of textiles in
late 2004. is Paltry as they may seem, these taxes represent between 6 and 10%
of the cost of production of the items they cover.16 As both Europe and the
United States began to announce safeguard investigations against Chinese
textiles in early 2005, the authorities in Beijing made further attempts to avert
a trade spat by raising China's per-unit export taxes on seventy-four of these
categories to RMB 1 ($0.125) on May 20, 2005, under the condition that they
would be rolled back if safeguards were imposed.17
The Europeans were quick to take advantage of the breathing room
afforded by these taxes to cut a deal with China on June 10, 2005 that will
limit the growth of Chinese exports of eight categories of textiles to between
8% and 12% per annum for the next three years.' 8 These moves, however,
were not enough to prevent the United States from slapping safeguards on six
categories of Chinese textiles between May 23 and 27. This more
11. Id. art. 2.2.
12. Id. art. 8.
13. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Decision of 10 November 2001, art.
16.1-16.6, WT/L/432, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/
tIWT/L/432.doc.
14. Id. art. 16.9.
15. The Great Stitch-Up: The Textile Industry, ECONOMIST, May 28, 2005, at 77.
16. Id.
17. Jiang Wei, China To Scrap Export Tariffs on 81 Types of Textiles, CHINA DAILY, May 30,
2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/englislVdoc/2005-05/30/content_446875.htm.
18. Memorandum of Understanding on the Export of Certain Chinese Textile and Clothing
Products to the European Union, EU-China, June 12, 2005, available at http://europa.eu.int/ comm/
trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/mou tex china en.htm.
19. Announcement of Request for Bilateral Textile Consultations with the Government of the
People's Republic of China I, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,722 (May 24, 2005); Announcement of Request for
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confrontational approach complicated American efforts to stitch up a deal
with China for some time, though ultimately a deal was reached on November
8 to limit the growth of thirty-four categories of Chinese exports to between
11% and 15% per annum until the end of 2008.20
The Euro-American import-restricting deals with the Chinese may be
strictly legal under WTO rules, but the spectacle of the world's two greatest
economic powers using the strongest measures available to block exports from
what is still a developing country is as unseemly as it is unnerving to those
who believe in the merits of rules-based trade. While someday there may be a
genuine need to apply safeguards against China that would be illegal against
any other country, wiser leaders would have reserved this strong medicine for
a real crisis and dealt with the textile issue using the standard non-
discriminatory safeguards sanctioned by the WTO.
The surge this year in Chinese textile imports may seem dramatic in
percentage terms, but this is largely an artifact of the manipulation of the
quota phase-outs such that the vast majority of them expired at the midnight
hour. Moreover, for all the histrionics of the textile producers, total textile
imports into the United States were up only 8% between January and August
2005,21 while in Europe total textile imports actually fell nearly 10% in the22
first five months of 2005. Especially in the case of the United States, where
numerous other textile exporters such as India and Bangladesh have also
posted double-digit increases in their shipments to the American market this
year, singling out China as the source of its textile industry's woes because it
is easy to impose safeguards against it reeks of China-bashing at a time when
Sino-American relations are already under strain.
The use of these extraordinary measures against China is made all the
more dispiriting by the relative insignificance of the textile industry to both
the European and American economies. In the United States, the textile
industry employed some 680,000 workers as of January 2005, of which all but
270,000 worked outside the garment sector most affected by the purported
import surge.23 The entire textile sector thus represents one half of 1% of the
total non-farm employment in the American economy, with the garment
sector representing just two-tenths of 1%.24 These numbers must be further
placed in the context of an American economy that has generated an average
Bilateral Textile Consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China II, 70 Fed. Reg.
30, 930 (May 31, 2005).
20. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Trade in Textile and Apparel Products, U.S.-
China, Nov. 8, 2005, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/WorldRegions/NorthAsia/
China/asset uploadfile9l_8344.pdf.
21. OFFICE OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
MAJOR SHIPPERS REPORT: SECTION 1, TEXTILES AND APPAREL IMPORTS BY CATEGORY IN DOLLARS,
APPAREL IMPORTS-ALL MFA FIBERS (QUANTITY), 08/2005 DATA (2005), available at
http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/rnsr/catvl.htm.
22. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL TRADE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF
TEXTILE AND CLOTHING PRODUCTS LIBERALISED IN 2005 (2005), available at http://trade-
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124109.pdf.
23. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEES ON NONFARM
PAYROLLS BY MAJOR INDUSTRY SECTOR AND SELECTED INDUSTRY DETAIL, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED,
available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.ceseeb3.txt.
24. Author's calculations using data from id
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of 167,000 net new jobs per month in 2005, despite the effects of the Gulf
Coast hurricanes.25
Taken together with the generous adjustment assistance that European
and American governments at all levels provide to workers who lose their jobs
due to trade liberalization, and the substantial gains that would be achieved in
consumer welfare and inflation control by finally allowing free trade in
textiles, it is tremendously disappointing that the United States and the
European Community have resorted to taking discriminatory measures against
China, when both had ten years to prepare for a world without quotas.
It may be better for the Chinese to have the certainty and stability
afforded by a three-year agreement rather than to be subjected to the
capricious use of discriminatory safeguards by the Europeans and the
Americans, but the great Chinese textile flap bodes ill for the successful
completion of the Doha Round of trade talks launched in 2001, in which WTO
members are attempting to tackle the far trickier issue of liberalizing trade in
agriculture. Much more than with textiles during the Uruguay Round, the
hopes of the developing world are riding on harnessing their massive natural
comparative advantage in this sector to ride their way towards development
and prosperity once trade in agriculture is liberalized.
For now, the developing world's hopes have been delayed by the failure
of WTO members to wrap up the round as per the original schedule at the
December 2005 ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. These hopes will have
been tragically misplaced, however, if the leaders of the world's richest
economies lack the courage to resist the powerful interest groups that will be
arrayed against any change in the agricultural trade status quo. The
disappointing performance of the two economic superpowers in managing the
liberalization of the textile trade thus far does not inspire confidence in their
ability to effectuate much greater changes to the fabric of the trade regime,
which is unfortunate since confidence, unlike textiles, cannot be cut out of
whole cloth.
25. Author's calculations using data from BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT, HOURS, AND EARNINGS FROM THE CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS SURVEY;
Series Report CESOOOOOOOOO, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate.
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Sudan's Courts and Complementarity in the Face of Darfur. By Dawn
Yamane Hewett.
On March 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council made history by referring
its first case, the mass atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan, to the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Soon after the ICC Prosecutor announced
that he would open an investigation, the Sudanese government responded by
establishing special criminal courts to try crimes committed in Darfur. This
Recent Development assesses whether creation of these courts by Sudan
means that the ICC may no longer try cases of this nature because of the
complementarity provision in the Rome Statute.1 I proceed by reviewing the
Darfur atrocities and the principle of complementarity, and conclude by
identifying several issues that will be particularly important in determining
whether Darfur cases will be tried before the ICC.
Violence in the impoverished Darfur region has raged since February
2003, when two local groups attacked government forces and installments,
citing mistreatment of black African tribes by the Arab-dominated
government. 2 Khartoum has responded forcefully with a bloody campaign
against civilians. Non-governmental organizations claim that the Sudanese
government also sponsors self-organized militias, including the notorious
Janjaweed.3 The violence has resulted in the deaths of an estimated 180,000
people in the first eighteen months and the displacement of approximately two
million people throughout the harsh, arid region.4 Human rights groups have
documented widespread rape, torture, murder, looting, and the destruction of
entire villages. 5 The United States has termed the campaign genocide.6 Early
in 2004, a U.N. official declared the situation in Darfur the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world.7
In October 2004, in response to mounting international pressure, U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan created the International Commission of
Inquiry for Darfur to investigate alleged violations of international law and
determine whether genocide was occurring. While the Commission declined
to label the events as genocide, it reported in January 2005 that the
government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, and rebel forces were all responsible for
serious violations of law and sent the names of fifty-one individuals to the
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See Press Release, Sudan Divestment Campaign, Senate Panel Clears Sudan Divestiture
Bill (June 16, 2005), http://www.sudandivestment.com/njleg.html [hereinafter Sudan Divestment Press
Release].
3. See, e.g., Taylor Maltz, Sudanese Genocide and Chinese Development, GLOBE, Oct. 2005,
http://www.gwias.com/globe/archive/000073.html.
4. See Jeevan Vasagar & Ewen MacAskilU, 180,000 Die from Hunger in Darfur, GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED, Mar. 16, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Sudan/story/0,14658,1438471,00.html.
5. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l USA, Sudan: Human Rights Concerns, http://www.amnesty
usa.org/countries/sudan/index.do (last visited Dec. 18, 2005).
6. See Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, US. Calls Killings in Darfur Genocide, WASH. POST,
Sept. 10, 2004, at Al.
7. See Mass Rape Atrocity in Western Sudan, BBC NEWS, Mar. 19, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3549325.stm
8. S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 564 (Sept. 18, 2004).
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U.N. Security Council for further action.9 The Commission further found the
Sudanese government unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute the
crimes committed in Darfur, stating that "[t]he measures taken so far by the
[Sudanese] Government to address the crisis have been both grossly
inadequate and ineffective, which has contributed to the climate of almost
total impunity for human rights violations in Darfur."' 0
Building on the findings and recommendations of the Commission, the
U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1593 on March 31, 2005.1 The
resolution invoked Article VII of the U.N. Charter, declaring the situation in
Darfur a threat to international peace and security, and officially referred it to
the ICC. The resolution further recognized that Sudan was not a State Party to
the ICC, but required it nonetheless to "cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this
resolution."' 2 The Sudanese Council of Ministers' reaction was apoplectic,
pronouncing its "total rejection" of the ICC. 13 Sudanese President Umar al-
Bashir stated that Sudan would not hand over any nationals to the Court and
reaffirmed Sudan's sovereignty and independence, its impartiality, and the
competence of its judiciary. 14
After assessing the crimes and admissibility of the Darfur atrocities, ICC
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced on June 6, 2005 that he would
open an investigation into crimes in Sudan. 15 One week after this
announcement, Sudan countered by establishing a domestic tribunal to try
some 160 individuals suspected of war crimes.1 The Minister of Justice, Ali
Mohamed Osman Yassin, declared the Sudanese court "a substitute to the
International Criminal Court."'
7
The Rome Statute creating the ICC entered into force on July 1, 2002.18
The Court began operating in March 2003, and, as of the date of the Darfur
referral, had pending investigations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). 19 The case of Darfur, however, differs significantly from
Uganda and the DRC, both of which are State Parties to the Rome Statute and
conferred jurisdiction upon the Court through self-referral. In contrast, the
ICC obtained jurisdiction over the Darfur case only through the U.N. Security
Council referral. Sudan maintains that one reason why the Court lacks
jurisdiction is because it has not ratified the Rome Statute. However, under the
9. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secretary-
General, 6, U.N. Doc. S/2006/60 (Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Sudan Report].
10. Id
11. S.C. Res. 1593, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
12. Id.
13. SUDAN: Darfur War-Crime Suspects Won't Go to ICC, Government Says,
IRINNEWS.ORG, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?Report l D= 464 36.
14. SUDAN: National Courts to Try Suspects of War Crimes, IRINNEWS.ORG, June 15, 2005,
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=47654 [hereinafter National Courts Article].
15. See Darfur: ICC Prosecutor Briefs Security Council, HUM. RTS. NEWS, June 29, 2005,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/sudanl 1233.htm [hereinafter HRW Darfur Editorial].
16. See Sudan Divestment Press Release, supra note 2.
17. See National Courts Article, supra note 14.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13.
19. See Peter Apps, ICC Hopes for Uganda Trial in Six Months, Then Congo, GLOBAL POL'Y
F., Jan. 26, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2005/0126ugandatrial.htm.
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Rome Statute, U.N. Security Council referral obviated the need for territorial
20or personal jurisdiction through State Party status.
The Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC should be only
"complementary to national criminal jurisdictions."' Moreover, the Preamble
of the Rome Statute also declares that "effective prosecution must be ensured
by taking measures at the national level" and that "it is the duty of every State
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes., 22 Because these complementarity provisions apply to a U.N.-referred
situation, the main challenge to the ICC's jurisdiction is Sudan's recent
establishment of the special Darfur courts.
The complementarity provision is further codified in articles 17(1)(a)-(c)
and 20(3) of the Rome Statute. 23 These articles prevent the ICC from
assuming jurisdiction over a case if: (1) the state having jurisdiction is
investigating or has prosecuted the case; (2) the state has investigated, and
then elected not to prosecute, an individual; or (3) the state has already tried
24the individual. However, there are important exceptions to this rule. Articles
17 and 20 further state that the ICC may prosecute if the State is "unwilling or
unable" to prosecute "genuinely., 25 The Rome Statute does not define what
constitutes a "genuine" prosecution, but the drafting history indicates that the
term allows for some subjectivity in determining the "unwillingness" of a
state to prosecute. 26 Section 2 of article 17 and section 3 of article 20 clarify
that a state may be considered "unwilling" to prosecute, even if domestic trials
are taking place, if the purpose of national proceedings is to shield individuals
from criminal responsibility; if there was an unjustified delay in proceedings;
if the proceedings were not independent or impartial, or if the proceedings
27failed to accord with international due process norms. Article 17, section 3
notes that a State may be "unable" to prosecute in the case of total or
substantial collapse or unavailability of the judicial system.
28
In January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry reported that
Sudan had failed to demonstrate willingness to prosecute, a finding with
which the UN Security Council and ICC Prosecutor agreed.29 However, these
assessments predated the establishment of the Sudanese special courts in June
2005. Therefore, the Prosecutor must now show to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
that the efforts by the Sudanese national courts are not genuine and that the
ICC therefore may retain its jurisdiction over the case.
30
20. Rome Statute, supra note 1.
21. Id. art. 1.
22. Id. pmbl.
23. Id. art. 17(1)(a)-(c), 20(3).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery To Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 899-900 (2002).
27. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(2), 20(3).
28. Id. art. 17(3).
29. Sudan Report, supra note 9.
30. Article 19 of the Rome Statute allows both Sudan and any accused individuals to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the case on grounds referred to in article
17. Sudan has made declarations rejecting the Court, but whether Sudan has formally invoked
complementarity in the method prescribed by the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence is unknown.
Additionally, it is unclear which party would bear the burden of proving admissibility of the case.
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When the Sudanese government announced that it would conduct its
own investigations, Antonio Cassese, former head of the Commission of
Inquiry, asserted that "[t]hese [trials] will have no credibility. The country has
no way to conduct proper trials, the whole judiciary is flawed., 31 Similarly,
human rights groups have been skeptical of Sudan's motives.32 The Sudanese
government insists that it is committed to the national proceedings. Chief
Justice Jalal-Eddin Mohamed Osman of the specialized courts emphasized
that the Sudanese judiciary is "capable, willing and committed to shoulder full
responsibility in the establishment of justice and restoration of rights.
33
The ICC should tread carefully. In judging Sudan's willingness and
ability to prosecute, the Court will be setting its first precedent. Also, one of
the ICC's stated goals is to encourage states to bring the guilty to justice
themselves. Most importantly, very little evidence is readily available for a
determinative assessment of Sudan's "unwillingness" or "inability" to
prosecute in a'genuine manner.34 This is particularly apparent with respect to
several issues that will be central to whether the ICC will retain jurisdiction.
One issue to view critically is the timing of the establishment of Sudan's
domestic courts. There is no question that, for over two years, Sudanese
officials declined to act, even in the face of highly publicized reports of
appalling atrocities, and that once Moreno-Ocampo made his announcement,
the government reacted quickly by creating the domestic tribunal. These two
elements-inaction followed by hasty action-may lend credence to the claim
that the Sudanese court was only established to shield the accused from
liability for their alleged crimes. However, if fair trials are held, one could
argue that the ICC has fulfilled its mandate of fostering domestic
accountability by prompting Sudan to take prosecution seriously.
Consequently, rather than emphasizing the timing, the Prosecutor and Court
should look most critically at the procedural and institutional features of the
trials as they progress.
For example, because the Commission of Inquiry specifically implicated
the current Khartoum government in atrocities committed in Darfur, any court
established by this government will naturally be suspected of lacking the
crucial elements of independence and impartiality. As an expert paper
commissioned by the Office of the Prosecutor noted, "[c]ommonality of
purpose between suspected perpetrators and state authorities involved in
investigation, prosecution or adjudication . . . constitutes circumstantial
31. Marlise Simons, Sudan Poses First Big Trial for World Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2005, at A12 (quoting Antonio Cassese).
32. Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch noted, "let's get real: the Sudanese authorities
have shown no interest whatsoever in prosecuting those most responsible for the crimes in Darfur."
HRW Darfur Editorial, supra note 15; see also Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Sudan: National Court for
Crimes in Darfur Lacks Credibility (June 13, 2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
print/ENGAFR540592005.
33. Sudan: Judiciary Challenges ICC over Darfur Cases, IRINNEWS.ORG, June 24, 2005,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2005/0624coltaborate.hti.
34. In 2003, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor empanelled a group of experts to explore the
principle of complementarity in practice. In an annex, the authors put forth a helpful list of indicators of
"unwillingness" and "inability." See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER: THE
PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE 28-31 (2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf'
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evidence for an inference of non-genuineness." 3 However, such
circumstantial evidence alone will not be sufficient to form the basis of a
compelling case for ICC prosecution.
A key factor to watch in determining the willingness to prosecute is the
kind of crimes and individuals prosecuted. As of the end of November 2005,
the Sudanese courts had convicted at least two Sudanese military members for
the murder of a Darfur local whom they accused of complicity in the
rebellion.36 Local groups assert, however, that the courts will only prosecute
common law cases rather than crimes against humanity and war crimes.
37
Human rights groups also point to the fact that none of the Sudanese
governmental initiatives toward ending impunity for the accused thus far
(including a national inquiry, investigatory committee, and the recently
established tribunals) has resulted in the suspension, investigation, indictment,
or prosecution of any mid to high-level civilian official, military commander,
or militia leader.
38
If, as the prosecutions continue, there is a pattern of indictments for only
common law crimes such as murder (rather than war crimes) and only low-
level perpetrators, the ICC would have ample grounds for prosecution. In fact,
this would be the perfect case of complementary prosecutions, with Sudan
prosecuting a lower-level tier of perpetrators and crimes, and the ICC
prosecuting select individuals accused of grave atrocities. However, if the
Sudanese courts begin to indict high-level officials or prosecute individuals
for international crimes, the case for ICC jurisdiction would be more difficult.
In this case, the Prosecutor would need to inspect procedural and institutional
features of the national trials to ascertain whether they were conducted
independently, impartially, in accordance with due process, and without undue
delay, political interference, or the express purpose of shielding culpable
individuals.
As this is the first case of a Security Council referral of an uncooperative
non-State Party to the ICC, there is no case law on complementarity in
practice. Further investigations by the Prosecutor as to the institutional and
procedural features of the Sudanese courts and their trials are in order.
Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch noted, "[w]ith Darfur, the court has
moved into the big league and now the burden is on the prosecutor to produce
.... Darfur certainly focuses attention in a way that the investigations in the
Congo and Uganda have not."39 Indeed, all eyes are on the Court.
35. Id. at 29.
36. AMNESTY INT'L, SUDAN: ARMING THE PERPETRATORS OF GRAVE ABUSES IN DARFUR
(2004), http://web.amnesty.orgllibraryIndex/ENGAFR541392004?open&of:ENG-2u6.
37. Id.
38. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Put Sudan's Top Leaders on Sanctions
List (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/sudan 12186.htm.
39. Simons, supra note 31 (quoting Richard Dicker).
280
2006] Recent Developments
The Stankovic Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. By Rocio Dig6n.
On September 29, 2005, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)' transferred the first mid-level accused war
criminal, Radovan Stankovic, from the ICTY in The Hague to the Bosnian
War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo. This transfer, authorized under Rule 11
bis of the ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure,3 represents a landmark for
both international criminal law and the national rule of law. The ICTY, one of
the most effective supranational courts, particularly when compared to other
ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, is
slated to close its doors in 2010, before all of the mid- and lower-level
accused are tried. The importance of successful transfers under Rule 11 bis is
two-fold: these transfers are an integral part of realizing the ICTY's
completion stratefy, and a key step in rebuilding the rule of law in a post-
conflict situation.
Rule 11 bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence sets forth the
specific terms of such transfers to national jurisdictions. 5 A three-judge
Referral Bench of the Trial Chambers can refer cases proprio motu or at the
request of the Prosecutor to state authorities in three different jurisdictions: the
territory where the crime was committed, the territory where the accused was
arrested, or another territory that has jurisdiction and is willing to accept the
case. 6 The territory where the crime was committed, i.e., the countries of the
former Yugoslavia, will likely receive the majority of the transfers, both
1. Cf Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (May 25, 1993), amended by S.C. Res.
1166, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (May 13, 1998).
2. Nicholas Wood, World Briefing Europe: Bosnia: UN. Transfers First War Crimes
Suspect to a Local Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A12; Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, First ICTY Indictee To Be Transferred to a State in the Former Yugoslavia for
Trial (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2005/pI008-3.htm.
3. ICTY R.P. & EvID. 11 bis.
4. Thus far, ten defendants have been referred to national jurisdictions pursuant to Rule 11
bis, and one request for transfer has been denied (i.e. the "Vukovar Three"). ORG. FOR SEC. AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, ISSION TO CROATIA, BACKGROUND REPORT ON DOMESTIC WAR CRIME
PROSECUTIONS, TRANSFER OF ICTY PROCEEDINGS AND IISSING PERSONS 2 n.4 (2005), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/2005/08/16067-en.pdf. Of these ten, however, only four are
currently in detention centers in their national jurisdictions awaiting trial; six are still awaiting decisions
of the ICTY Appeals Chamber on their transfer to the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia.
5. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 11 bis.
6. Id. The Appeals Chamber found that there is no hierarchy of transfer within Rule 11 bis
for transfers and that states have thus far been unable to establish any sort of hierarchy. "The Appeals
Chamber holds that, where there are concurrent jurisdictions under Rule 11 bis (A)(i)-(iii) of the Rules,
discretion is vested in the Referral Bench to choose without establishing any hierarchy .... A decision
of the Referral Bench on the question as to which State a case should be referred (vertical level, i.e.
between the International Tribunal and individual States) must be based on the facts and circumstances
of each individual case in light of each of the prerequisites set out in Rule 11 bis (A) of the Rules."
Prosecutor v. Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR1 lbis.2, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral, 33, (Nov.
15, 2005). Larry Johnson raises the question of fairness with respect to the trial of an accused under Rule
11 bis (A)(iii): "[l]t has also been asked whether it would be fair to subject an accused indicted by the
Tribunal and arrested in the former Yugoslavia to a jury trial in a common law country, especially if
neither the accused nor his counsel has any familiarity with that system." Larry Johnson, Closing an
International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human Rights Standards and
Excluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 170 (2005).
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because this will allow the citizens of the former Yugoslavia to observe justice
firsthand and because the internationalized War Crimes Chamber is located in
Sarajevo.
The Referral Bench will authorize a Rule 11 bis transfer only if it has
received assurances that "the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death
penalty will not be imposed or carried out," the "gravity of the crimes
charged" is limited in geographic and temporal scope, and the "level of
responsibility of the accused" is of the mid- or lower-level.7 To ensure a fair
trial, Rule 11 bis allows the Referral Bench to revoke a transfer order,
provided that the relevant national court has not reached a final decision.8 The
standard of review for a competent national jurisdiction and for the
determination of seniority have been set forth in two slightly different ways.
While Rule 11 bis calls for a determination of a competent national
jurisdiction prior to a determination of seniority, the ICTY Completion
Strategy resolutions first assess the rank of the accused and then determine the
competent national jurisdiction.9 In determining the existence of a competent
national jurisdiction after assessing seniority, the Completion Strategy
implicitly assumes that a competent national jurisdiction does, in fact, exist.
Structurally, all of the Referral Bench decisions adopt this approach,
determining seniority first, then jurisdiction, and then assessing the applicable
laws.
The ICTY Referral Bench handed down its first Rule 11 bis decision in
the case of Prosecutor v. Stankovic on May 17, 200510 and a subsequent
Appeals Chamber decision on September 1, 2005." The two-fold purpose of
Rule 11 bis was reflected in the notably comprehensive decisions. First, the
Referral Bench invoked established principles of international criminal law to
confirm the legality of and procedures for Rule 11 bis transfers. This in-depth
treatment should prevent future appeals on the same question, and allow the
ICTY to continue trying only the senior-most accuseds. Second, the Bench set
forth non-binding guidelines on the applicable laws in the domestic courts.
These guidelines should strengthen the credibility of the first domestic
decisions on war crimes, and facilitate the entrenchment of the rule of law in
the Balkans. As Stankovic's trial at the War Crimes Chamber has not yet
commenced, I focus here on the legality and requirements of Rule 11 bis.
The first critical step in establishing a solid legal foundation was the
Appeals Chamber's review of Rule 11 bis's legality. The Appeals Chamber
7. ICTY R.P. & EVD. 11 bis (B), (C). Security Council Resolution 1534, in relevant part,
requires that the ICTY report to the Council on "the transfer of cases involving intermediate and lower
rank accused to competent national jurisdictions." S.C. Res. 1534, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/i 534 (Mar. 26,
2004) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1534].
8. In particular, ICTY Rule 11 bis (F) stipulates that "[alt any time after an order has been
issued pursuant to this Rule and before the accused is found guilty or acquitted by a national court, the
Referral Bench may, at the request of the Prosecutor and upon having given to the State authorities
concerned the opportunity to be heard, revoke the order and make a formal request for deferral within
the terms of Rule 10." ICTY R.P. & EvID. 11 bis (F).
9. See S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 7, 5.
10. Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under
Rule 11 bis (May 17, 2005).
11. Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-ARlIbis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis
Referral (Sept. 1, 2005).
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concluded that the amendment to the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
to include Rule 11 bis provided the necessary legal basis for transfer to
national jurisdictions, relying on the established international law doctrines of
functionalism and implied powers.
12
In the analysis of the Rule's legality, the Appeals Chamber did not have
to decide on its power of self-review; this power is located in the principle of
"kompetenz-kompetenz" as introduced in Prosecutor v. Tadic:'
3
This power, known as the principle of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" in German ... is part,
and indeed a major part, of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or
arbitral tribunal, consisting of its "jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction." It is a
necessary component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not need to be
expressly provided for in the constitutive documents of those tribunals .... 14
Prior to the 1995 Tadic decision, kompetenz-kompetenz had traditionally been
invoked by arbitral institutions in determining their authority. But since Tadic,
the kompetenz-kompetenz principle has been applied or cited as precedent in
numerous ICTY decisions and referenced in international criminal law
literature. 15 The decision in Tadic had the immediate effect of settling the
question of the ICTY's jurisdiction and the long-term effect of establishing
kompetenz-kompetenz as the principle that would enable self-review by
international organizations. The impact of the Tadic decision on the Stankovic
Appeals Chamber jurisdictional decision is clear: the Appeals Chamber was
able to quickly conclude that it could review its own competence, and move to
the issue of the implied power granting the Tribunal the right to transfer cases
under Rule 11 bis.
The Appeals Chamber provided ample evidence that Rule 11 bis
referrals were within the scope of the Tribunal's legal mandate and implicitly
approved by the UN Security Council.
16
And even if the explicit authority to conduct such transfers from the Tribunal to national
jurisdictions is not given to the Tribunal by the Statute itself, the interpretation of Article
9 of the Statute... has been backed by Security Council resolutions .... The Tribunal
judges amended Rule 11 bis to allow for the transfer of lower or mid-level accused to
national jurisdictions pursuant to the Security Council's recognition that the Tribunal has
implicit authority to do so under the Statute.
1 7
12. Id. 14-17. The concept of implied powers was first introduced in the International
Court of Justice's 1949 Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion, which stated: "Under international
law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the
Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties." Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174, 182, 184 (Apr. 11).
13. This was the first case tried before the ICTY and the first time that the principle of
kompetenz-kompetenz was applied to a jurisdictional decision in an international criminal law tribunal.
14. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR71, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 18 (Oct. 2, 1995).
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Aleksovsi, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Judgment on Appeal by
Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt (May 30, 2001).
16. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
17. Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-ARllbis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis
Referral, 16 (Sept. 1, 2005).
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Although the Security Council did not explicitly endorse the creation of Rule
11 bis in any of its resolutions, it has consistently recognized the transfer
strategy and its various components (including Rule 11 bis transfers).' 8 This
consistent recognition provides legal grounds for the transfer of cases; there
was no need to explicitly modify the rules. The Chamber's emphasis on this
recognition was necessary in order to prevent future appeals on these same
grounds.
The concept of implied powers, which enables international
organizations to exercise rights that are not expressly enumerated in their
founding charters, assumed even greater importance in the Appeals
Chamber's ruling on the boundaries of the Referral Bench's powers. The
boundaries of implied powers are central to the determination of
responsibilities allocated between the Prosecutor and the Referral Bench. This
determination hinges on a practical analysis of reasonableness and necessity.
The Appeals Chamber gives the Referral Bench fairly wide discretion in its
activities as long as they are "reasonably related" and necessary to achieving
the end goal of transferring accuseds to domestic jurisdictions under Rule 11
bis.
Employing this test, the Appeals Chamber found that the Referral Bench
can order the Prosecutor to report in six months on case developments, but
that it cannot order the Prosecutor to enter into agreements with international
organizations for trial monitoring. The Chamber distinguishes between these
two tasks via the argument that the latter exceeds necessity and
reasonableness. The Prosecutor has the inherent authority to decide whether or
not to enter into agreements with international organizations, and, according
to the Chamber, there is no reasonable justification for the Referral Bench to
tread into this authority.' 9 This decision, however, risks being criticized as
arbitrary. An argument can easily be made that ordering the Prosecutor to
enter into trial monitoring agreements is necessary for the determination of
whether the trial is fair prior to transfer of the accused.
The resolution of these jurisdictional and implied powers questions in
the first Rule 11 bis case raises key questions for future referrals. All of the
other Rule 11 bis referral decisions-with the exception of the joint
indictment of Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac-have been appealed. How will
these appeals affect the Completion Strategy? At a practical level, they will
delay decisions of the Appeals Chamber regarding senior-level accuseds being
tried at the ICTY. On a theoretical level, they could further complicate the fair
trial of accuseds and the successful execution of the Completion Strategy.
When the Referral Bench stipulates the court to which the accused
should be transferred, it does so after concluding that the court will provide a
fair trial for the accused. However, what happens if the accused is then
extradited or transferred to a different state, and no ruling as to a fair trial is
18. A number of UN resolutions request updates on the status of Rule 11 bis transfers, see,
e.g., S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 7, 6, and both Carla del Ponte and Ted Meron have addressed the
Security Council on the ICTY's progress in executing the Completion Strategy. There has never been
any objection to Rule 11 his transfers as a means of delegating part of the ICTY caseload.
19. See Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case. No. IT-96-23/2-ARI lbis.1, Decision on Rule 11 bis
Referral, 51, 54 (Sept. 1, 2005).
Recent Developments
made? If the ICTY is still in operation, the Tribunal can exercise its Chapter
VII primacy and request that the accused be returned to The Hague pursuant
to Rule 11 bis and Article 10 of the Statute. 20 But this would have the effect of
delaying the scheduled closure of the ICTY past 2010 and delaying the
establishment of the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia.
Taking this one step further, what happens if these events unfold after
the ICTY has been shut down? The ICTY can invoke authority under its
Chapter VII-based primacy and return the case to the ICTY, but no national
court-not even the War Crimes Chamber-has any authority to request that a
case be returned to the War Crimes Chamber if it is transferred elsewhere.
It is now abundantly clear that the Referral Bench and Appeals Chamber
decisions that led to Stankovic's transfer closed the door to inquiries about the
validity of transfer and the scope of the Referral Bench's powers, only to open
the door to some very difficult questions. Does the ICTY have the power to
transfer cases to national jurisdictions? If so, from where is this power
derived? How are implied powers allocated between the Prosecutor and the
Referral Bench? The challenge now is for these questions to be promptly
answered by the Appeals Chamber so that the transfer and trial of accuseds
may proceed smoothly. In many respects, the continued success of the ICTY
and the prospects for internationalized domestic courts depend on meeting this
challenge.
20. See Dominic Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and Its Completion Strategy, 3 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 82, 170 (2005).
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